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Apparently overruling earlier decisions, the Supreme Court of
Delaware has recently declared that a merger effected "for the sole
purpose of freezing out minority stockholders ...is an abuse of the
corporate process ...[and a] violation of a fiduciary duty for which
the Court may grant.. . relief."' In Singer v. Magnavox Co.,2 a parent
corporation had merged with its eighty-four-percent-owned subsidiary.
Minority stockholders of the subsidiary had received only cash for their
shares and thus had been eliminated from participation in the com-
bined enterprise. The court confirmed that the parent owed a fiduciary
duty to the minority by reason of its status as majority stockholder, but
then-in what is generally viewed as a new development in Delaware
law-the court held that this duty would not be met unless a corporate
purpose for the merger, other than mere elimination of the minority-
held stock, were supported by the evidence.
In Tanzer v. International General Industries, Inc.,3 decided a few
weeks after Singer, the court resolved the question of whose corporate
purpose was relevant in parent-subsidiary mergers by holding that a
merger that conveyed an economic benefit to the parent corporation
sufficed to meet the standard of fiduciary conduct erected in Singer,
provided that the transaction was otherwise "entirely fair" to the
minority stockholders of the subsidiary. In effect, the displacement of
a subsidiary's public stockholders was held to be lawful under the
Delaware statute if, but only if, a commercial benefit could be demon-
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1. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del. 1977). The Singer court dis-
tinguished cases refusing to enjoin freezeout mergers by stating that "none of these
decisions involved a merger in which the minority was totally expelled via a straight
'cash-for-stock' conversion in which the only purpose of the merger was, as alleged here,
to eliminate the minority." Id. at 978. For example, the court observed that Stauffer v.
Standard Brands Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (1962), which held that appraisal was
the minority's only remedy against an allegedly unfair freezeout price, did not approve
"a merger accomplished solely to freeze-out the minority without a valid business pur-
pose." 380 A.2d at 979. Similarly, the court wrote that David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley
Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971), was inapposite because it did not involve "a
.cash-out merger,' the sole purpose of which was to eliminate minority stockholders." 380
A.2d at 979.
2. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). The current upheaval in Delaware law may well be
traceable to criticisms articulated in Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections
Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
3. 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
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strated. That benefit could be confined to the parent's interest, and
thus no advantage to the subsidiary need be alleged, so long as the
merger, viewed overall, was fair to the minority.
These developments in the Delaware jurisprudence are part of a
rapidly growing body of modern case law, federal as well as state, on
corporate freezeouts. Although the United States Supreme Court has
now held that section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act does not
empower the federal courts to create an independent common law of
fiduciary obligation, 4 other elements of the federal securities scheme,
chiefly the proxy rules, have stimulated the federal courts to develop
rules for measuring damages in the merger context that reflect a will-
ingness to expand existing concepts and experiment with new ideas.
In Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,5 the Seventh Circuit for the first
time adopted an explicit sharing-of-benefits formula in determining
whether the amount paid to minority stockholders of a merged sub-
sidiary constituted fair treatment, and the Supreme Court itself, in a
case arising under the Investment Company Act, has had to rule with
respect to the fairness of a merger between a major operating company
and the holding company that controlled it., Beyond these judicial
developments, there appears at present to be considerable interest in
the idea of a "federal minimum standards act"-legislation that would
displace, and in some sense upgrade, the local law of fiduciary obliga-
tion, of which the rules on freezeouts must certainly be a part. What
the "minimum standards" should be is obviously a question for debate.
That such a debate is underway, however, is itself a development of
note.7
These events, actual or prospective, reflect the circumstance that
litigation in the freezeout field has become exceedingly active during
the past ten years. Decisions like Singer have highlighted the vulner-
ability of the freezeout to challenge, and it is fair to say that such
transactions are almost impossible to manage at present without the
expectation of dissent and litigation. This costly process may be neces-
sary and useful for the time being. In the end, however, one hopes to
see the law progress toward settled standards and a reliable basis for
fair dealing between inside and outside stockholders.
Essential to any such progress are a rational classification of freezeouts
4. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 495-96 (1977).
5. 552 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3293 (U.S. Nov. 1, 1977).
6. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46 (1977).
7. For a sampling of the issues and arguments, see The Role of the Shareholder in the
Corporate World: Hearings Before the Subcomin. on Citizens and Shareholders Rights and
Remedies of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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and plausible fairness criteria for the treatment of public stockholders.
A considerable body of legal writing has already been directed toward
these ends, and we hesitate to add still more to the literature. But the
recent Delaware decisions, though plainly intended to increase the
protection of public investors, seem ambiguous in critical ways and
possibly erroneous. In particular, the Singer decision, however laud-
able in spirit, contains two potential errors that ought to be avoided
or corrected before they become fixed and general. One such error
may be a failure to perceive that all freezeout transactions are not
alike-that there are important contextual distinctions among freeze-
outs that need to be observed. As others have pointed out, freezeouts
fall into three analytically distinct categories:8 (a) two-step, or in-
tegrated, mergers; (b) pure going-private transactions; and (c) mergers
of long-held affiliates. The corollary, overlooked in Singer, is that
different fairness criteria and different protections for minority stock-
holders are appropriate to each. In addition, and relatedly, the Dela-
ware court's effort to distinguish "good" from "bad" freezeouts by use
of a business purpose test was misdirected. Such a test has no role what-
ever to play in this field. Instead, the presence or absence of a business
purpose should be treated as inherent in the categories mentioned
above.
The time thus seems quite appropriate for a restatement of corporate
freezeouts in clearer terms. By way of limitation, we should note that
our discussion is directed solely at freezeouts involving public stock-
holders-roughly, stockholders who have no active role in management
and whose percentage interest in the company is small. Freezeouts in-
volving closely held firms raise issues, essentially deadlock problems,
that are very different from those addressed here.9
8. See Borden, Going Private-Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 987,
989-1000 (1974); Green, Corporate Freezeout Mergers: A Proposed Analysis, 28 STAN. L.
REV. 487, 490-96 (1976). The present authors have addressed some of the issues involved
here in Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARY.
L. REV. 297 (1974) [hereinafter cited without cross reference as Fair Shares], and in
Brudney, A Note on "Going Private," 61 VA. L. REV. 1019 (1975).
9. In close corporations, freezeouts generally arise in the context of a dispute over the
disentanglement of what are essentially partnership arrangements among more or less
active participants for whose securities there is no market. See Brudney, supra note 8, at
1031; Green, supra note 8, at 513. The parties are visibly at loggerheads over division of
the business's prosperity or over the conduct of its business; their disagreements are of a
continuing kind, likely both not to be resolved until the business terminates and to
plague the parties as they remain unable to disentangle satisfactorily. There is, therefore,
reason to facilitate or encourage the departure of one group or the other from the
enterprise-both in terms of the personal well-being of the participants, and because of
the impact of continuing disagreements on their conduct of the enterprise. It does not
follow that corporate law should permit the controlling group to have an advantage in
bargaining over the terms of the break-up. Still, the difficulty with flatly forbidding
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Classification of Freezeouts
The essence of a freezeout is the displacement of public investors by
those who own a controlling block of stock of a corporation, whether
individuals or a parent company, for cash or senior securities. The
public investors are thus required to give up their equity in the enter-
prise, while the controllers retain theirs. Freezeouts most commonly
take the form of a merger of a corporation into its existing parent or
into a shell corporation newly formed for the purpose by those who
control the merged entity.
Freezeouts, by definition, are coercive: minority stockholders are
bound by majority rule to accept cash or debt in exchange for their
common shares, even though the price they receive may be less than
the value they assign to those shares. But this alone does not render
freezeouts objectionable. Majority rule always entails coercion. It is,
nonetheless, an acceptable rule of governance if all members of the
voting constituency share a common goal and if all will be identically
affected by the outcome of the vote. In the ordinary arm's-length
merger negotiated by the managements of two unrelated corporations,
stockholders of the merged entity are properly viewed as having a
common interest in maximizing the returns on their stock, whether
through periodic dividends or through sale or liquidation of the firm.
Once approved by a statutory majority, the terms of such a merger will
apply equally to each of the merging company's stockholders, and the
common decision will satisfy the principle that all members of the
class be treated alike. Majority rule is thus an appropriate means of
deciding whether an arm's-length merger should be allowed, and it is
of course a universal feature of the corporate law. Despite the element
of coercion, dissenters to such a merger are bound, or remitted to an
appraisal proceeding, by vote of a majority of their class, because it is
freezeouts is that, if the majority does not have the power to force the minority out, the
majority may be forced to accede to the demands of the minority because of the threat of
deadlock. Moreover, unlike the investors in a public corporation, the parties in a close
corporation can contract in advance about their arrangements; any skew in the corporate
law that permits majority power to displace the minority can thus be offset by contract.
Modern statutes purport to offer special solutions for the problem of disentangling the
essentially personal relationships of parties in conflict in close corporations. See, e.g.,
DEL. CODE tit. 8, §§ 352, 355 (1975); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW, § 1104 (McKinney 1963); id.
§ 1ll1(b)(3), (c). If, notwithstanding such legislation, freezeouts are permitted by statute,
any judicially imposed solution will require compliance with some conception of "fair-
ness," however crude it may be. But it is hard to see any role for "business purpose" as a
doctrine in filtering permissible from impermissible freezeouts in close corporations, even
as that conception is rigorously confined in cases like Schwartz v. Marien, 37 N.Y.2d 487,
492, 335 N.E.2d 334, 338, 373 N.Y.S.2d 122, 127 (1975), or Wilkes v. Springside Nursing
Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976).
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assumed that any disagreement among the stockholders involves
nothing more than a practical judgment about the best way to achieve
a common aim.
Freezeouts obviously differ from arm's-length mergers in that all
the members of the same class of stockholders do not receive identical
treatment: the controlling stockholders retain their equity but force
the minority, the public investors, to accept cash or debt. In this con-
text, majority rule does not protect the public investor from the danger
that he will be denied his pro rata share of the value of the combined
company. To be sure, this danger is present even when the outside
stockholders receive new common stock in the surviving company and
hence are not frozen out, for the amount of common stock they receive
may be insufficient. But most agree that the likelihood that public
investors will be treated unfairly is greater when, as outside common
stockholders, they receive cash or debt, with the insiders in effect
receiving or retaining the equity. One inevitably suspects that in-
equality of treatment underlies the distribution of different forms of
participation or payoff to members of the same class, and experience
suggests that payouts to the public in cash or senior securities often
reflect a temptation to undercompensate the public investors. In any
event, determining whether all members of the class have in fact been
treated equally is necessarily more difficult when payouts are in dif-
ferent forms.
All freezeouts, then, involve the distinct possibility that a self-in-
terested majority stockholder or control group'0 has ruled unfairly,
and all require special safeguards to ensure that minority stockholders
receive equal though not identical treatment." Such safeguards can
10. The reference to "majority" stockholder as the possessor of coercive power is not
meant to be confined to a person or persons owning a majority of the voting stock. It
includes those whose control of the enterprise through stock ownership and domination
of the proxy apparatus effectively enables them to determine the terms of the merger.
11. The merger statutes, whether short-form or long-form, which authorize different
formal treatment of members of the same class, do not prescribe different substantive
treatment. See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 251(b) (prescribing contents of agreement to merge
or consolidate domestic corporation), (f) (describing conditions under which approval of
merger by shareholders of surviving corporation is not required) (Supp. 1977); id. § 252(b)
(applying § 251(b) to merger or consolidation of domestic and foreign corporation), (e)
(same, for § 251(f)) (1975 & Supp. 1977); id. § 253(a), (d) (short-form merger provisions)
(1975 & Supp. 1977); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 902(a)(3) (requiring merger plan to set out
terms and conditions of merger) (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1977); id. § 905(a)(2) (requiring
merger plan to set forth amount and designation of affected stock), (3) (requiring merger
plan to specify what consideration will be given for stock of merged corporation); id.
§ 910 (appraisal rights for dissenting shareholders). Nor does their provision for majority
vote leave unrestrained discretion in self-dealing majorities or preclude judicial imposi-
tion of restrictions, including a categorical prohibition, on some kinds of actions thus
authorized to be taken by a self-dealing majority.
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take various forms, ranging from antideception regulations, such as a
requirement of disclosure of interest, to a flat prohibition against the
action contemplated, and may include rules aimed at assuring a fair
price for the minority's shares. Which, if any, of these alternatives is
appropriate depends largely on the relative danger of abuse and on the
social value of the objective served by the elimination of the minority
interest-factors that vary with the context in which the merger occurs.
Our own view is that mergers representing merely a second step in
the takeover of a target firm by a previously unrelated company pre-
sent the least need for protective regulation and can be dealt with
largely through the familiar medium of advance disclosure. At the
other extreme, pure going-private transactions are of small value and
high risk and hence should be prohibited. Mergers between affiliated
operating companies, though also susceptible to abuse, at the same
time promise social benefits in varying degree, and in our opinion are
best regulated by rules relating to fairness of price. A strong tradition
of fiduciary obligation is present in the last two situations; little or
none in the first (when properly viewed). In each case the context itself
defines the appropriate regulatory reaction; in none is there a need to
engage in a hectic search for independent business reasons to justify the
transaction.
A. Two-Step Mergers
Majority rule in cases of mergers or sales of assets between unrelated
companies is an unobjectionable and universal feature of the corporate
law. The stockholders of the acquired company will hold hetero-
geneous views on the intrinsic value of its shares, but once the
acquiring company offers a price per share for the target company's
assets that equals or exceeds the value assigned to those shares by a
statutory majority, the case for majority rule becomes overwhelming.
The alternative-to permit a single nay-voter to bar the merger-is
well-nigh unthinkable, for, by compelling or encouraging stockholders
to engage in hold-up behavior, it would, in effect, make mergers and
sales of assets a practical impossibility. No one, presumably, would
view that consequence as desirable. In conventional theory, the take-
over of one company by another offers major social and private bene-
fits in the form of improved management, and the threat of takeover is
thought to operate as an essential element of market discipline upon
incumbent managers. One may have reservations about how aptly the
theory applies in a given case, but surely no sensible legal system would
impose a rule of stockholder unanimity on the sale of a business. Some,
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indeed, have doubted whether even so mild a right of individual dissent
as appraisal can be justified in this context.' 2
Straightforward asset purchase is not, of course, the only form of
business acquisition. Especially when the target company's manage-
ment opposes the sale of the firm, the acquiring company may seek to
effect the acquisition by cash tender offer for the target's shares. Such
an offer, again at a premium over the current share price, may be for
all of the target's stock and is rarely for an amount less than that which
would assure control to the acquiring company. Assuming the tender
offer succeeds, there will always remain some untendered shares out-
standing, whether through inertia or because the tender price is thought
too low by a minority of the stockholders. Often in these circumstances
the acquiring company will act promptly to eliminate the untendered
shares by merging the target company with itself or with a wholly
owned subsidiary created for that purpose. Since the acquiring com-
pany now controls the target, it can unilaterally set the terms of the
merger and vote through its approval.
Quite obviously, however, the two steps in the acquisition-tender
offer plus merger-are integrated and represent a "plan." The analogy
to a unitary purchase of assets is close and compelling; the only major
difference is the absence of initial approval of the takeover by the
target company's board, a factor that may increase, rather than reduce,
the total price paid by the acquirer.13 Although the tag-end merger
appears to be an example of self-dealing by the majority stockholders,
it is only superficially of that class. Realistically, the tender-plus-merger
procedure is merely a way of bypassing the target company's proxy
machinery, which is controlled by the incumbent board, and sub-
mitting the acquisition proposal to direct referendum of the stock-
holders. Those who accept the tender offer are properly to be regarded
as aye-voters, those who do not, as nay- or non-voters. Tender by a
majority is the equivalent of a conventional majority vote; the sub-
sequent merger merely gives effect to the majority's decision to accept
the terms of the acquisition. The requisite "vote" has already been
12. See Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern
Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 72-74, 84-86 (1969). Eisenberg does not
argue that appraisal should be eliminated. For an even more pessimistic view, which
concludes that appraisal remedies are rarely of advantage to either shareholders or
corporations, see Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Franh
Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 234-35, 238, 260-62 (1962).
13. See Troubh, Purchased Affection: a primer on cash tender offers, HARv. Bus. REV.,
July 1976, at 79, 80; cf. note 18 infra (discussing circumstances in which tender offer may
produce lower price than would result from good-faith bargaining).
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cast by the time the tender offer is completed, and the acquiring com-
pany is not really a voter in the original constituency at all.
In these circumstances, there really is no transaction between related
parties and no self-dealing whatever. The acquiring company should
be seen as an unrelated outsider throughout the takeover-from the
time the tender offer is made to the time the merger is concluded. It
has, or should be held to have, no fiduciary obligation as such, since as
an outsider offering cash for the target's assets, it owes no duty to the
stockholders of the sort that normally attaches to those who manage a
firm or who own the controlling interest. It has no obligation to set a
"fair" price for the target's property and should have no duty to dis-
close its management plans or to reveal any other values that it has
discovered as an outsider. The heart of the takeover process is the
exploitation of opportunities through the purchase of ownership and
the substitution of new management. Seen as a takeover, the context is
plainly not one in which fiduciary duty has any plausible or customary
application. It is, literally, and despite the forced merger, an instance
of arm's-length dealing.
The authors have suggested elsewhere that two-step takeovers, though
not affected by fiduciary concepts, do require a modicum of regulation
in view of the fact that public market transactions are involved and in
view of the dangers of deception and "whipsaw."' 41 Thus we have
proposed that tender offerors who contemplate a second-step merger
be required to announce their intention at the time the tender offer is
made. In addition, we think it appropriate that the price paid in the
merger for the shares then outstanding be the same as the price offered
on the initial tender.1a This "regulation" is designed both to apprise
14. Fair Shares at 330-40. "Whipsaw" refers to shareholders' rushing to accept the
tender offer because they fear that, if the bid for control succeeds, they will be frozen out
at a lower price. See id. at 337.
15. To force the later merger at a price other than the tender price raises questions
either of adequate disclosure in the tender solicitation or of fairness in the merger. For
a discussion of the problems of allowing a lower merger price, see id. at 336-40; cf.
Brudney, supra note 8, at 1054-55 (permissibility of two-step mergers should be tied to
fair price rule). But cf. Borden, supra note 8, at 1006-07 (arguing that in going-private
mergers, merger price should be set just below tender price to prevent shareholders from
holding back in tender offer in hopes of obtaining higher price). Judicial failure to con-
sider this problem is reflected in Schulwolf v. Cerro Corp., 86 Misc. 2d 292, 380 N.Y.S.2d
957 (Sup. Ct. 1976). The judicial lapse in this matter may have resulted from the court's
misplaced concentration on the question of "business purpose," which is quite irrelevant
in a two-step merger.
As pointed out in Fair Shares at 335, 338, it may be difficult to determine whether a
merger is in fact the second step in an acquisition, and some rule of thumb, perhaps one
that raises a presumption of initial intent to merge if the merger in fact follows within
a specified time, is needed, see id. at 340 n.87; cf. Green, supra note 8, at 493 n.23
(proposing one-year rule). Even if the acquirer initially intends to obtain 100% of the
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stockholders that the initial tender offer, even if for less than one
hundred percent, may eventuate in an acquisition of all of the target's
shares, and to protect stockholders from being stampeded into accept-
ing the tender price by the prospect of being forced to accept a lower
price on merger if the tender succeeds. The aim here is to prevent the
two-step nature of the acquisition from being concealed or improperly
exploited; hence the rules are chiefly procedural and do not go to price
or any other question of substantive fairness except in the respect that
they require all stockholders to receive a pro rata share of the sale
proceeds. 16 Most particularly, no effort is made to raise the issue of
"business purpose." Takeovers by outsiders must be assumed to have
a commercial goal that suffices by itself to justify the transaction.
Somewhat ironically from our standpoint, Singer v. Magnavox Co.
not only involved a two-step asset acquisition, but even appears to have
met the procedural requirements stressed in the preceding paragraph.
A less promising case for the assertion of the need for business purpose
is therefore difficult to imagine. In August 1974, North American
Phillips Corporation offered to acquire all the shares of Magnavox for
cash at the rate of eight dollars per share. The tender offer advised
that North American intended to acquire the entire equity interest in
Magnavox and that it would, depending on the number of shares ac-
quired, resort to "a merger, a sale or exchange of assets, liquidation or
some other transaction" to carry out its aim. The directors of Magnavox
voted to oppose the offer on the ground, among others, of inadequacy
target's stock, such intent is not enough to justify classifying a later merger as "two-step"
if the acquirer delays while economic uncertainties affecting the acquired company are
resolved. In such cases, fairness in the merger may require not only that the acquirer bear
the risk of failure by paying the tender price, but also that it share the benefits of
success by paying a higher price if the acquired company's value has increased. For a
case that may fit this hypothetical, see Young v. Valhi, Inc., Civ. Nos. 5428, 5430 (Del.
Ch. Feb. 22, 1978).
16. This conclusion is subject to qualification if the takeover is effected with the
purchased cooperation or neutrality of the management of the target company. In that
case, as when the management of an acquired company in an apparently arm's-length
merger is bribed by the acquirer, the dealing is no longer accurately characterized as
being at arm's length, and fiduciary constraints become relevant in appraising the pro-
priety of the transaction. Though it is not easy to tell when the cooperation or neutrality
of the target's management has been purchased rather than given on the merits, that
probability becomes more than trivial when negotiations between the target's manage-
ment and the bidder's management result in elimination of the former's publicly ex-
pressed opposition, notwithstanding that such change in position is accompanied by an
increase in the tender price. Hence the judicial task in assessing challenges to two-step
mergers is not confined to assessing the adequacy of the disclosure in the tender solicitation
to induce the consent of the tendering stockholders. It may-at least if the tender is not
"overhead," i.e., over the opposition of the target's management-include an inquiry into
the circumstances surrounding the acquiescence of the target's management. See Fair
Shares at 340-44.
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of price, and expressed shock at an eight-dollar offer in the face of an
eleven-dollar per share book value. In September the differences were
compromised, with the Magnavox officers receiving new employment
contracts and the offering price being raised to nine dollars per share.
Roughly eighty-four percent of Magnavox shares were tendered. Some
eight months later, North American absorbed the remaining sixteen
percent by merging Magnavox with a wholly owned subsidiary. The
price paid on the merger was the same as that offered in the tender-
nine dollars per share-and was also paid in cash.
Dissident stockholders challenged the merger on the grounds that it
served no business purpose other than the elimination of the minority
stockholders, that the cash price was inadequate, and that the merger
violated the antifraud provisions of the state Securities Act. Reversing
the court of chancery, which had held that appraisal was the sole remedy
for dissenting stockholders, the supreme court ruled that cash-out
mergers were an "abuse" under Delaware law unless the acquiring
company could demonstrate a business purpose independent of the
cash-out. It added, citing the well-known Sterling case, 17 that even if
such a business purpose were shown to exist, the merger would still be
subject to attack on grounds of "faimess"-presumably a reference to
the adequacy of the price paid to the minority. North American thus
had to surmount the double barrier of business purpose and fair price
before the merger would be approved.
As we have tried to suggest, however, the transaction in Singer does
not appear to be of the kind to which the customary trappings of
fiduciary duty should be attached. The merger of Magnavox into North
American was, apparently, nothing more or less than the concluding
step of a business purchase by an outsider. Since fiduciary limitations
would have been irrelevant had such a purchase taken a unitary form,
it seems undesirable to impose them on what is essentially only a variant
procedure, one that is likely, if the tender is made over the opposition
of management, to yield a higher price for the seller's shares than would
the single-step alternative.' 8
17. Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (1952).
18. In some instances, however, a tender offer, even an overhead tender, may not
produce a price for the target company's assets as high as that which would be produced
if the target company's management were bargaining faithfully and singlemindedly to
obtain the maximum price. The element of coercion in the tender, even the overhead
tender, and in any event the absence of genuine bargaining by a knowledgeable representa-
tive, permits the bidder to set the price at an amount it deems just enough to attract the
dispersed and uninformed stockholders of the target. The bidder has no obligation to
inform them about the hidden assets of their company even if it knows of any. To be
sure, the bidder's price cannot to too low if the management of the seller opposes the
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The court's error, in that view, is the consequence of a mistake in
identification. Because minority stockholders were being paid off in
cash, the court at once concluded that the transaction was a freezeout
and therefore decided that the requirements of business purpose and
fairness should apply. But the danger in a freezeout is that a majority
stockholder who is in fact an insider will force the minority to accept
an unfair price for their interests. North American was, of course, the
majority stockholder in Magnavox at the time the merger took place,
but it became so only by reason of the tender offer that immediately
preceded the merger. The merger terms satisfied the requirement we
would impose, namely, that the acquirer be bound by the tender price
that the majority of the target's stockholders have accepted, and that it
not be allowed to set new terms after becoming an insider. If the
tender and the merger are viewed as integrated steps, then the Mag-
navox stockholders were no more frozen out by North American than
are nay- or non-voting stockholders in a one-step purchase of assets.
Rather, those Magnavox shareholders who tendered their stock to
North American compelled the nontendering minority to accept the
same cash payment for their shares in the subsequent merger. Since all
stockholders of the selling company received the same price per share,
appraisal should indeed have been the only remedy available to dis-
senters who thought the price accepted by the majority was too low.
Once the tender-plus-merger procedure is equated with the unitary
sale of assets, the same legal status should result.
From another standpoint, it is possible that the Delaware court was
concerned about the compromise between the managements of North
American and Magnavox, which included new employment contracts
for the latter. Indeed, this may have been a crucial factor, for it raises
the question whether the transaction was truly arm's length, or
whether the Magnavox management had in fact received a personal
consideration for its change of position. This may partly explain why
tender and is able to reveal reasons for the target's stock being worth more, or indeed
seeks to find another purchaser at a higher price. But there is reason to believe that a
tender offer is likely to be made at a price lower than would result from a bargain be-
tween two maximizers. This fact, if it be one, does not implicate the fiduciary obligations
attending absorption of a long-held subsidiary by a parent. The buyer, by definition, is
a stranger and therefore does not have a parent's fiduciary obligations of disclosure or of
fair dealing. If the seller's management has failed to disclose hidden assets but has not
been bought out by the buyer, then its failure is, at most, a failure of care, a matter of
business judgment on which the law is notoriously elastic. In short, the question whether
dispersed public stockholders are properly exposed to the risk that an overhead tender will
give them less than would an organized bargain on their behalf poses interesting issues in
corporate law, but it does not implicate the fiduciary duties or the question of "fairness"
involved in the merger of a long-held subsidiary into its parent.
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the supreme court directed the court of chancery to reexamine the
"entire fairness" of the transaction on remand. Just how such a re-
examination is to be carried out remains something of a mystery. But
to the extent that the assignment of that task reflects an alert interest
in the bona fides of the target's management in the takeover, the new,
or renewed, enforcement of fiduciary obligation in Singer is a welcome
development in the jurisprudence of this vital jurisdiction. It does not
detract from that conclusion to insist that, in the absence of reason to
question the bona fides of the target's management, the pattern of
overhead tender plus merger at the tender price is one in which issues
both of "purpose" and of "fairness" are beside the point.
B. Going Private
Going-private transactions of the sort that have made financial head-
lines in recent years exhibit a factual pattern quite distinct from that
of the two-step merger. 1 Here, controlling stockholders who are
responsible for the company's management, having determined that
its shares are undervalued by the market relative to its prospects and
expectations, seek to terminate the public stockownership and return
the firm to the status of a closely held entity. Typically, the insiders
create a holding company, to which they transfer their controlling
shares, and then propose a merger of the operating company into the
holding company.20 The plan is that public stockholders of the
operating company receive cash (borrowed by the operating company
or drawn from its working capital) equal to the current market value
of their shares plus a premium, while the insiders emerge as sole
owners of the equity. Quite obviously, the insiders are not engaged in
a takeover as North American was in Singer, because by definition they
controlled the firm to start with. They aim simply to increase their
investment interest from a controlling fraction of the company's stock
to one hundred percent.
The "fiduciary" status of the controlling stockholders in these cir-
cumstances is presumably beyond question, and it is here, no doubt,
that Singer's close scrutiny of the insiders' motives is best applied. In-
deed, it has been argued that the impact of "fiduciary duty" should be
19. See, e.g., Jutkowitz v. Bourns, No. C.A. 000268 (Cal. super. Ct. Nov. 19, 1975);
Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 135 N.J. Super. 35, 342 A.2d 566 (1975).
20. Often the merger is preceded by a tender offer by the company for its own shares.
As suggested at p. 1370 infra, the tender and the merger are plainly integrated steps and,
hence, should be dealt with as a unit. See Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903, 909-11
(1975).
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even stricter than Singer suggests,2 1 and that insiders simply ought not
to be permitted to use corporate processes to eliminate the public in-
terest in the firm. Although insiders may of course purchase shares in
their individual capacities by bidding for them in the market, the
exploitation of the corporate proxy machinery, to which they alone
have access, for the purpose of forcing public stockholders to give up
their shares is regarded as a significant "abuse" in all but "exceptional"
situations. In this view, the element of sheer coercion is fatally ob-
jectionable. Others find unfairness in the circumstance that the firm,
having gone public when the market was buoyant and high, now
elects to go private when the same market is depressed, and will
presumably go public again when market averages recover. Taking
advantage of market swings-first sucking in the public's money, and
then squeezing out the public's participation-is deemed a misappro-
priation of a corporate asset.2 2 Still other critics have urged that exist-
ing standards on disclosure of inside information, though adequate to
regulate individual market purchases, simply never can be stringent
enough to prevent abuse when the entire minority interest is forced
out through a merger.2 3 Timing, as well as price, is within the discre-
tion of the majority, and even if all relevant financial information has
been disclosed, it is argued, insiders ought not to be allowed to act on
their own interpretation of the data by compelling other stockholders
to accept a more pessimistic view of the company's outlook than the
one they hold themselves.
From the standpoint of the corporation, the justification commonly
offered for going private is that the elimination of public investors will
enable the company to save the legal and accounting costs of complying
with SEC and stock-exchange disclosure requirements as well as the
expense of carrying on stockholder relations in one form or another.
This, however, is an inadequate justification, and in many instances
we would doubt its sincerity. The costs of monitoring management's
conduct are incurred for the benefit of the public stockholders, and it
hardly rests with the fiduciary to cite the saving of those costs as a
reason for terminating the beneficiaries' interest without their consent.
21. Brudney, supra note 8, at 1029-30, 1030 nA2 (if neither appraisal rights nor fair-
ness test protects public stockholders in going-private context, courts can exercise tradi-
tional equity powers to prohibit going-private transactions when there is no unanimous
stockholder consent).
22. Note, supra note 20, at 931.
23. This appears to be the conclusion of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) in proposed rules 13e-3 and 13e-4. See S.E.C. Release No. 33-5884 (Nov. 23, 1977),
reprinted in [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) j 81,366 [hereinafter cited
as SEC Release].
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Moreover, the amount of that saving, measured per share of stock out-
standing, is too small in most cases to explain the company's action-
itself costly-in retiring a major fraction of its stock. The Singer deci-
sion strongly implies that a corporate purpose is necessary to sustain
the legal validity of going private. To meet that condition, the
proponents should be required to show that public stockownership is
actually inconsistent with the company's continued viability, not
merely that public ownership entails a cost that can be avoided by
eliminating the public's interest. But we are not aware that such a
showing has ever been made in a going-private case, and we doubt it
ever could be. As suggested above, takeovers by outsiders, which may
include merger as a second step, must be assumed to involve at least the
possibility of an improvement in the target company's management.
And as suggested below, mergers between affiliated corporations may
entail economic and related benefits in the form of "synergy" or the
like. By contrast, going private simply shifts publicly owned stock into
the hands of the insiders and promises no economic gains to the enter-
prise that can be regarded as significant.
2 1
With so little to justify dilution of its strictest mandate, the fiduciary
principle suggests that going private transactions should in all cases
be prohibited. This approach would interpret corporate statutes-as we
believe they were intended to be interpreted-as not permitting in-
siders unilaterally to condemn the stock of public investors when the
effect is to leave the public with no chance to return to the enterprise.
Merger legislation that authorizes exclusion of public stockholders
serves its purpose if read as permitting pay-outs in cash or senior
securities only in two contexts: in take-overs or sell-outs at arm's length
and in those self-dealing mergers that permit the displaced public in-
vestor to reenter by using the condemnation price to purchase new
participations in the continuing merged enterprise. Where no such
reentry is possible,2 5 the statutes need not be read to permit the freeze-
out, no matter how high the condemnation price, unless specific
24. See Brudney, supra note 8, at 1028-29. It has been argued that policy considerations
favor going private, because it decreases costs associated with public ownership, protects
against takeovers, and assures that control will remain in the hands of the insiders, who
have the largest stake in the enterprise. Borden, supra note 8, at 1013-14. These arguments
beg the question whether the benefits of going private belong solely to insiders or must
be shared with all stockholders. Indeed, Borden himself concludes that a price set by
insiders "should be presumed to be . . . unfair," id. at 1018, and formulates a rule for
allowing reentry into the enterprise if it again goes public, id. at 1039-40; see note 28
infra.
25. Rules requiring reentry have indeed been proposed, but they would operate only
if the company again went public and in any event do not seem feasible. See note 28
infra.
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language expressly authorizes "going private."
Even were there no such "constitutional" objection, the merger
statutes should properly be construed to permit the displacement of
public investors only if the displaced stockholders receive fair treat-
ment. But going private, by its very nature, offers no feasible means of
determining whether public stockholders have in fact been fairly com-
pensated for their interests. If taking the firm private increases its
value by reducing accounting and legal fees and the cost of relating to
public stockholders, determining the displaced stockholders' fair share
of the increment thus expected to result from their displacement
presents intractable problems. To quantify the benefits embodied in
the explicit justifications offered for going private would be difficult
enough. But if account must also be taken of the unspoken benefits,
such as tax advantages and other perquisites, 26 that would accrue to
the controlling stockholders as a result of being freed of public ac-
countability, the problem of implementing a fairness standard comes
close to being insurmountable.
Moreover, the unavoidable suspicion is that the insiders will elect to
go private at a moment in time that they perceive as a turning point in
the company's affairs-but before that perception has become general.
In these circumstances, the danger that the public stockholders will be
undercompensated is too great to tolerate. To be remitted at such a
time to statutory appraisal rights or to a costly if not impossible fair-
ness proceeding by their own management is not only a serious dis-
service to the public stockholders, but also (in Singer's words) "an
abuse of the corporate process." The problem is compounded by the
fact that, once a public market for the company's securities has been
eliminated, no reliable basis remains for judging whether the ousted
stockholders were fairly compensated for their interest. The impact of
subsequent events on the value of the company's shares obviously
cannot be determined, for even hindsight is blinded when the company
is closely held.
In this setting neither "business purpose" nor "fairness" provides a
test or a justification for separating permissible from impermissible
cases of going private. The economic value of eliminating SEC moni-
toring expenses and similar costs is simply not sufficient to overcome
the likelihood that public stockholders will be cheated or to justify
the cost of prevention. Given the absence of social benefit, the strength
of fiduciary obligation, and the danger of unpoliceable abuse, the
26. See, e.g., SEC v. Parklane Hosiery, Inc., 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977) (availability of
company funds to discharge personal debts).
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simplest and the best response the corporate law can make to going-
private transactions is a flat prohibition.
It has been argued, however, that, apart from the concerns just ex-
pressed, there are a significant number of publicly held corporations
whose stock is not sufficiently widely distributed to be traded, so that
public stockholders have a thin market, if any, and therefore are locked
into the company. Permission to unlock their positions by buying them
out for cash is said to be manna to them.2 7 We do not know how many
such companies-which are "public" but lack an active market for their
shares-exist. But however numerous they may be, the notion that be-
cause the market for its stock is "thin," the corporation should be able
to force its stockholders out, with no feasible test of fairness, simply
asserts that stockholders have no entitlement to their stock so long as
insiders deprive them of it at any price above the market price. That
surely is not a tolerable norm under the received learning or under any
other values that underlie the corporate system. Nor is it self-evident
that, if the insiders are forbidden from using corporate cash to displace
the outsiders, the latter will be intolerably locked in, or indeed will be
worse off than under a rule permitting them to be frozen out at or
above market price. If the enterprise is failing or headed for worse
times, insiders will not seek to buy out outsiders. If it is headed for
better times, strangers may well be willing to pay an arm's-length price,
and to pay it to all the stockholders, not just to the insiders. And it is
at least arguable that if no strangers appear, the increased prosperity
of the enterprise will be shared more readily with outsiders if they
remain locked in than if they can be forced out. Certainly, before
rejecting the command of the fiduciary principle categorically to
prohibit going private, empirical evidence of the need for a more
selective rule is required. All the suggested forms of a more selective
rule imply a restraint on insiders equivalent to a requirement of some
sort of fair treatment, but none offers a feasible test of fairness.
2 8
27. Borden, supra note 8, at 1003.
28. To condition "going-private" transactions on a second look at the enterprise after
a year or two to determine whether the public received an adequate price in the freeze-
out, as suggested in, e.g., Borden, supra note 8, at 1039-40, or to give the minority rights
to rescind their forced sales or warrants for repurchase in case the company goes public
again, see id.; Note, supra note 8, at 929-30, leaves the problems of defining adequacy,
i.e., fairness, and of reexamining or reconstructing corporate behavior during that in-
terim. Although enforcement by examination of corporate performance during the years
after the transaction to ascertain how its value assumptions have been borne out offers
more protection to public investors than does enforcement as of the date of merger, the
delay does not aid in defining the substantive standard of fairness or remove enough of
the difficulties of enforcement to ensure substantial compliance.
In SEC Release, supra note 23, the SEC has proposed, as restraints on going private,
requirements of disclosure and, in some cases, of fairness. The nature and import of the
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Finally, we would extend the prohibition against going private to
two-step arrangements in which the merger is preceded by a tender
offer from the company itself. As in the case of a tender offer by an
outsider followed by merger, two-step and one-step arrangements
should be assimilated and treated alike. Here, however, the factor of
like treatment points to the opposite conclusion: an absolute prohibi-
tion against going-private transactions, whether consummated in one
step or in two.
C. Mergers of Affiliates
Yet a third, and a different, regulatory problem is presented by a
proposed merger between a parent company and a subsidiary corpora-
tion that the parent has controlled for a more or less extended period
of time. Here, as in the' going-private context, the aspect of fiduciary
duty is clear. The parent's status as majority or controlling stockholder
is one that has long been held to carry with it a special obligation to
the minority stockholders of the subsidiary. In addition, it is necessarily
the case that both companies are managed, ultimately, by a single board
of directors, whose obligations of loyalty and care run equally and
concurrently to both sets of public stockholders-those of the sub-
sidiary as well as those of the parent. We suggest below that it may
conceivably make a difference whether fiduciary duty is rested on
majority stockownership or on the factor of joint management respon-
transaction are apt to be illuminated adequately in advance by the proposed requirements
for disclosure of the insiders' purposes and their plans or proposals for the corporation,
see id., Schedule 13E-3, Items 5-6, and of the bases for determining the amount and kind
of consideration offered and the fairness of the transaction, see id. Schedule 12E-3, Items
9-10. Those disclosures will undoubtedly help stockholders to respond knowledgeably to
a tender offer by the issuer. But although they may dilute, they will not eliminate the
elements of coercion in the transaction. Nor will disclosure induce enough negative votes
to abort the merger if the insiders control enough stock or even just the proxy apparatus.
In apparent recognition of the limited effectiveness of disclosure, the Commission's
proposal also seeks to assure fairness, at least in going-private transactions by companies
with stock registered under § 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 781
(1970 & Supp. V 1975). See Proposed Rule 13e-3(b), in SEC Release, supra note 23. Al-
though the proposal lists several relevant considerations that in some indeterminate mix
can produce a conclusion of fairness in any particular case, it offers no standard of fair
treatment. To combine the SEC's proposal (assuming it is authorized by the present
statute) with the suggestions for a "second look" would preserve the sell-out opportunity
for public investors in "worthy" cases (i.e., where there is a thin and depressed market)
and at the same time would impose constraints on the going-private process that would
produce significant benefits for public investors, possibly even "fair" treatment, if some
of the considerations listed by the Commission dominate the decision on fairness. How-
ever, to the extent that it has significant "bite," any such combination of remedies is not
likely to differ in consequence from our proposal, because of the probability that it will
discourage insiders entirely from going private. Their decisions would be affected by
fear of being held liable for nonculpable false statements if subsequent improvements in
the condition of the enterprise were not anticipated in the information disclosed.
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sibility. For the moment, however, it suffices merely to confirm what
is everywhere conceded, namely, that the parent must deal "fairly" with
subsidiary's stockholders, and that affiliation implies a special obliga-
tion of some sort.
Mergers between affiliates are thus distinguishable from two-step
takeovers, which are essentially arm's-length deals between unrelated
parties. But though obviously not at arm's length, affiliated mergers
offer private and social benefits of sufficient importance to distinguish
them from pure going-private transactions as well. Moreover, they can
feasibly be tested for "fairness."
In many instances, the merger of a partly held subsidiary into its
parent is designed to achieve operating economies or other economic
gains that are unavailable, or less readily available, when the two firms
are maintained as separate entities. Elimination of duplicated functions,
tax savings, and financial and stock market gains are among the bene-
fits commonly cited as potentially realizable through unification of
parent and subsidiary. These may or may not be substantial factors in
a particular case, but the possibility that joint ownership can result in
a larger overall value for the two firms than the sum of their values as
separate companies makes it impossible to deny that a business purpose
may exist, and exceedingly difficult, in any given case, to prove that a
commercial goal for the merger is wholly lacking. If the elimination
of the separate subsidiary does or even can produce a larger aggregate,
then presumably that step should not be discouraged and must not be
prohibited.
Even if "synergistic" gains of the sort just described were minimal in
a particular instance, there is a sound and creditable reason for man-
agement to want to reduce to one the number of stockholder con-
stituencies to which it is legally responsible. The difficulty of placing
intercompany dealings on a fair basis, of allocating overhead costs and
(where relevant) tax benefits between the companies, and in particular
the nearly impossible task of attributing opportunities for growth and
diversification to the "appropriate" unit2 9-these and related fiduciary
problems present issues of practical day-to-day administration that are
notoriously hard to solve. Corporate law spends much of its time
policing fiduciary conflicts, and all the sanctified literature in the field
is directed against the danger of serving two masters. It is not easy,
therefore, to take the position that a legal mechanism, even such a
mechanism as contrived merger, that aims to dissolve an existing con-
flict by bringing one such relationship to an end should be unavail-
29. See David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427 (Del. Ch. 1968); Fair
Shares at 308.
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able.30 We would urge that, from the standpoint both of internal man-
agement and of sound administration of the company laws, the simpli-
fication of parent-controlled subsidiary structures through merger
should be viewed as inherently "purposive." CongTess itself gave
recognition to this idea in a related area when it mandated the
simplification of complex public utility holding company systems.
Probably, self-help simplification of the sort considered here deserves
the same support-as indeed seems to have been the conclusion of
those legislatures that first enacted short-form merger statutes.
To conclude that mergers between publicly held parents and sub-
sidiaries serve ends sufficiently desirable to preclude categorical pro-
hibition of such transactions does not end the inquiry. As the authors
have suggested elsewhere, 31 that conclusion underscores the need for a
rigorous "fairness" test. Such a test should assure that the subsidiary's
stockholders are enabled to maintain their participation in the com-
bined enterprise if they so desire. Although ideally this goal should be
carried out by requiring that the subsidiary's stockholders be offered
common stock in the parent,32 state laws frequently depart from this
30. In this context the enforcement of fiduciary norms is a serious problem even when
management behaves in a perfectly neutral fashion and makes every effort to treat the
stockholders of both companies evenhandedly. Here, however, the problem is largely
"administrative," viz., to make sure that intercompany dealings are fairly structured as
between the two entities. It is not (or not solely) a question of restraining managers from
pursuing their own self-interest at the stockholders' expense.
In the going-private context, by contrast, there is only one legally recognizable claim
to management's best efforts-that of the company's stockholders, inside and outside
alike. The goal of evenhanded treatment presents no administrative difficulties as such,
because the corporate law recognizes no more than a single constituency. Allocation and
fair division problems should not arise unless management improperly creates two
constituencies by attempting to treat insiders and outsiders differently. Compliance with
fiduciary norms is not a matter of sorting out legitimate but conflicting claims, but of
living up to a standard of loyalty and care that is generally well understood.
Concededly, there are costs associated with fiduciary compliance in both of the abo e
contexts. The parent-subsidiary context, however, presents more reasons to fear over-
reaching by the parent and therefore, as the English law suggests, more reasons to
encourage elimination of the subsidiary's minority. See R. MOON, BusINEss MERGERS AND
TAKE-OVER BiDs 140-41 (4th ed. 1971). The cost of compliance relating to parent-subsidiary
dealings can be eliminated by uniting the two groups of public stockholders, but those
relating to management self-interest can be eliminated only by terminating public stock
ownership entirely. In the parent-subsidiary context, the "fairness" test provides a safe-
guard. In the going-private context, there is simply no reliable protection against the
danger of undercompensation of the public stockholders.
31. Fair Shares at 307-09.
32. See Brudney, supra note 8, at 1023, 1027, 1038 n.69 (noting problems of disparate
forms of payout, including those of finding acceptable new investment, of determining
equivalent values, and of reacquiring stock in parent, and concluding that offering stock
in parent is best solution); Green, supra note 8, at 508 n.68, 512 (proposing that mergers
between companies affiliated for five years or more be allowed only if stockholders of
merged entity retain equity interest in merged enterprise; for mergers of companies
affiliated for one to five years, administrative body should determine fair price).
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ideal by permitting debt or cash as well as stock to be paid out in a
merger.33 Even so, the standard of fairness should dictate that the
recipients receive enough in value to enable them to reacquire the
same proportionate interest in the parent that they would have pos-
sessed had the consideration received been common stock alone. Under
this standard, the use of cash in an affiliated merger is to be seen as
involving an exchange of the parent's common shares for those of the
subsidiary, followed by the parent's repurchase of a portion of its "out-
standing" stock. The direct use of cash in the merger collapses these two
steps into one, but the use of a shortcut (if permitted) should not be
allowed to disadvantage the minority stockholders.
This approach, we think, implies a "proportionate sharing" rule of
the kind applied by the Seventh Circuit in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
Co.3 4 In Auto-Lite the court found that the premerger value of the
subsidiary's publicly owned shares was about $28 million, that of the
parent $67 million-a total of $95 million. The postmerger value of
the securities of the combined enterprise was $99 million. Hence the
increment in value resulting from the merger was roughly $4 million.
Since the minority shares of the subsidiary constituted twenty-nine
percent (28/95ths) of the total premerger value of the stock of both
companies, the court held that the transaction would be treated as
"fair" if-and, indeed, found it to be "fair" because-the minority
stockholders received consideration worth not less than the premerger
value of their shares plus twenty-nine percent of the "merger incre-
ment."35
33. See note 11 supra; Brudney, supra note 8, at 1029 & n.39. Both the historical and
functional demands of the short-form merger statutes can be fully met by confining their
application to mergers between publicly held parents and subsidiaries, subject only to a
test of fairness. See Kemp v. Angel, 381 A.2d 241, 245 (Del. Ch. 1977).
34. 552 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3293 (U.S. Nov. 1, 1977).
35. Id. at 1248-49. The court's exclusive reliance on the market prices of the parent's
and subsidiary's stocks in applying the formula may well have been misplaced. Notwith-
standing the court's rejection of the specific distortions claimed for the market prices of
the stocks involved, other considerations suggest a more or less systematic distortion of
the prices of the stocks of subsidiaries, if only because of the overhang of a control block.
Moreover, the price of the subsidiary's stock is also affected by the market's perception of
the likelihood of improper diversion of the subsidiary's assets by the parent, see, e.g.,
David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30, 35 (Del. Ch. 1971); In re Talley
Indus., Inc., 44 S.E.C. 165, 180 (1970); cf. Tanzer v. Haynie, 405 F. Supp. 650, 654 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (fair price for minority stockholders includes consideration of earnings and prospects);
and by concealment of information or impediments to the flow of information about
future developments known to the parent.
Evidence from other contexts supports the proposition that market price is often a poor
indicator of value. It has been observed that there is a systematic disparity between
market prices and portfolio values of the stocks of closed-end investment funds, Malkiel,
The Valuation of Closed-End Investment Company Shares, 32 J. FINANCE 847 (1977), and
a systematic inadequacy of market price to measure value in insolvency reorganizations,
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Under A uto-Lite, therefore, if the value of a merged entity exceeds
the summed values of the parent and subsidiary taken separately, the
increment must be divided between both sets of stockholders in propor-
tion to the premerger values of their respective shares. Once again, the
simplest and least costly method for assuring "fairness" under this
formula is for the parent to issue its own common shares to the sub-
sidiary's stockholders in a ratio reflecting the values of each set of shares
just prior to the announcement date.-' But the benchmark is the same
for payments in cash or debt: after the merger the former stockholders
of the subsidiary must be in a position to participate in the combined
enterprise as fully as if payment had been in stock. By requiring that
any merger increment be shared proportionately, A uto-Lite helps to
assure that this objective will be met. Its virtue is that it prevents
freezeout by putting minority stockholders in a position to reacquire
their investment in the enterprise without dilution.
To be sure, this approach distinguishes between cases where the
parent is closely held as a result of a merger and cases where the parent
remains a public company, but the distinction is both proper and in-
herent. If the acquiring parent is "private," the use of cash or debt
may be unfair per se, because there is then no means for minority
stockholders to reacquire an equity interest-they are truly frozen out.
And, of course, there is no feasible way to determine whether the
freezeout price was fair. But when the parent is a public company, the
individual cash or debt recipients are free, if they wish, to restore their
participation by purchasing its shares in the market. That a "transac-
tion" is required is simply a cost (possibly one that ought to be
reimbursed) of using cash or debt instead of stock, but the exchange is
nevertheless "fair" if the amount received is sufficient to enable a
recipient to obtain the same stock interest that he would have had if
see Altman, Bankrupt Firms' Equity Securities As an Investment Alternative, FIN. ANALISIS
J., July-Aug. 1969, at 129; W. Blum, The Law and Language of Corporate Reorganization,
17 U. Cm. L. REV. 565 (1950); IV. Blum, Full Priority and Full Compensation in Corporate
Reorganizations: A Reappraisal, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 417 (1958); M. Blum, Failing Company
Discriminant Analysis, 12 J. ACCOUNTING RESEARCH 1, 11-12 (1971). Considerations com-
parable to those that distort market prices in cases of closed-end funds and insolvency
reorganizations affect the market prices of parent's and subsidiary's stocks. In such cases,
therefore, it is necessary to determine the values to be compared by reference to "in-
trinsic value" rather than simply to rely on market price. Cf. Fair Shares at 323-25 &
n.56 (difficulties of determining "value" exist but should not be much greater than at
present and should not be reason for rejecting most appropriate solution to fairness
problem in parent-subsidiary mergers-payment of fully adequate %alues). It is, of course,
possible that in Auto-Lite the same result would have been obtained by focusing on
intrinsic value.
36. These "values" are not likely to be determined by market prices, whether current
or averaged over any prior period. See note 35 supra.
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the parent had issued its shares in a ratio reflecting the premerger
values of the companies. The effect then is to allow management to
unite its stockholder groups without preferring one group to the other.
Minority stockholders are compelled to accept homogenization on the
gTound that private and social values justify that much compulsion,
but the A uto-Lite formula assures that it is only forced homogenization,
and not exclusion or dilution, that will result.
Tanzer v. International General Industries, Inc.37 apparently fits
this factual pattern. The parent corporation merged with its eighty-
one-percent-owned subsidiary, paying off the minority stockholders in
cash. The parent-subsidiary relationship was evidently longstanding.
Reacting to Singer, the parent asserted without contradiction that the
"business purpose" for the merger was to facilitate the parent's own
long-term debt financing, presumably by enabling it to use the sub-
sidiary's tangible assets directly, as loan security. The Delaware court
found this to be a legally adequate "purpose" but then remanded the
case for a further finding on whether the consideration paid to the
minority was "fair."
If the fairness standard is correctly applied on remand in con-
formance with the A uto-Lite formula, the outcome in Tanzer is one
that deserves approval. As indicated, however, the business-purpose
recital seems altogether unnecessary in this context and even potentially
distorting. If, as the court said, a majority stockholder can act in its
own interest and without concern for the economic interest of the
minority, then it might seem to follow that the majority owes no more
to the minority than would an outsider seeking to take the subsidiary
over. But this latter conclusion suggests that the parent can reserve to
itself the economic value of the merger, which is contrary to the posi-
tion taken in Auto-Lite. Thus Aiuto-Lite implies that management
should be seen to have the same fiduciary obligation to the stockholders
of both concerns and, accordingly, that any benefit resulting from the
merger must be shared proportionately.
Our own view is that no allegation of business purpose, whether
parent's or subsidiary's, need be made in cases of this sort. Indeed, an
excessive concern with business purpose may actually divert the courts
from focusing attention on fairness and other relevant considerations.38
37. 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
38. For illustrations of judicial focus on "business purpose" at the expense of adequate
attention to the problem of fairness in the merger, see Young v. Valhi, Inc., Civ. Nos.
5428, 5430 (Del. Ch. Feb. 22, 1978); Schulwolf v. Cerro Corp., 86 Misc. 2d 292, 380
N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup. Ct. 1976); Tanzer Economic Assocs., Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v.
Unihersal Food Sers., Inc., 87 Misc. 2d 167, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
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The goal of homogenizing the two stockholder constituencies carries
its own complete justification. What is needed, however, is a fairness
rule that assures that any monetary benefits will be properly shared
between the two constituencies, so that the only consequence of the
merger is the simplification or improvement of the corporate structure.
Conclusion
Our aim in this article has been to stress the need for a plausible
classification of freezeouts and to offer a coherent rationale for requir-
ing different protective rules for public stockholders in each class. One
way to summarize our approach is to say that it never permits a "true"
freezeout. Two-step takeovers, being acquisitions by outsiders, are not
properly to be viewed as freezeouts in the first place, any more than is
a unitary asset acquisition approved by a majority of the seller's stock-
holders. Pure going-private transactions are indeed true freezeouts, and
since their only serious aim is to enrich the insiders, they would be
flatly prohibited in all cases. No fairness test can save them. By con-
trast, mergers between parents and partly held subsidiaries fall short of
being true freezeouts because they do not irretrievably exclude public
stockholders from the enterprise. Moreover, though obviously self-
dealing, such mergers may be presumed to entail economic and related
benefits for the enterprise itself, so that prohibition is undesirable. The
appropriate solution is fairness, which can be attained either by restrict-
ing the permissible consideration to a proper proportion of the parent's
common stock, or by assuring that the subsidiary's stockholders are
placed in a position, through the receipt of cash or debt, to reacquire
an equivalent proportionate stock interest in the surviving entity.
Under these rules the factor of "business purpose" is irrelevant. None
need be shown in the two-step or in the parent-subsidiary context. In
all likelihood, none exists in going-private transactions. The main
effort, whether statutory or judicial, should be to identify the relevant
context correctly and then to execute the appropriate scheme of safe-
guards. We do not pretend that this will always be a simple matter. If
the proposed analysis is observed consistently, however, we would ex-
pect a material improvement both in the outcomes of litigated cases
and in the capacity of company managers and their advisers to forestall
litigation through planned compliance or forbearance.
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